...The ISEAS outlook for Southeast Asia in 2018 is out. Here is the Thailand analysis by Pongphisoot Busbarat, and you can download the full report via this link: https://t.co/qFvFGwTZ6T pic.twitter.com/1GRp8G8ouS— Andrew MacGregor Marshall (@zenjournalist) January 2, 2018
Excerpt:
THAILAND
Pongphisoot Busbarat
The royal cremation of late King Bhumibol Adulyadej in October 2017 marked the transition of Thailand into a new political era. Potential uncertainties are gradually overshadowing the legacy of the late king who provided the kingdom with stability and predictability for seven decades. Power arrangements between the military, the palace, and the government still remain unsettled after the 2014 coup.
Foremost, it remains uncertain how the relationship between the military and the palace will evolve. The new monarch, Maha Vajiralongkorn, has adopted a more direct approach to convey how his wishes should be met, as exemplified by decrees that expand his power, especially in palace affairs and wealth and certain military matters. Although the relationship between these two power centres shows no conflict on the surface, it is unclear to what extent the military will accommodate this new approach.
To contain uncertainties, the military has designed a new political structure through the new constitution. It empowers the junta leaders to appoint members of the Senate with veto power and has opened several channels for the possibility of a non-elected Prime Minister. The military will undoubtedly be able to exercise its influence in the legislature after the next election, whenever this may be, through the Senate or directly through the position of the Prime Minister.
The court case against former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra on the rice-pledging scheme and her surprising escape from Thailand in August 2017 has added another uncertainty for 2018, especially within the pro-Thaksin faction. It helps legitimize the military government and tilts political weight toward the anti-Thaksin group. Coupled with the new constitutional design, pro-Thaksin political parties, which have dominated elections over the last two decades, may not be able to either gain the majority or establish a majority government after the next election.
The Yingluck case will affect Thai politics in several ways beyond elections. Positively, it will inform future administrations that corruption can lead to a legal and political fate similar to what Yingluck and other government officials have suffered. On the other hand, judicial power will be more pervasive in relation to the executive branch. This could well lead to less innovative policies that are less responsive to the needs of the population, since policies must to be framed to suit the junta’s long-term plan. This development would again place
Thai politics in the hands of the bureaucracy and the technocrats whose conservative institutional objective is to preserve the status quo. Notwithstanding the attempts to achieve stability and reduce the Shinawatras’ influence, Thailand’s decade-long political struggle continues. Since a widely accepted process of national reconciliation has not taken place, Thailand will have to suffer strong tensions between groups contending for control of the state in the foreseeable future.