เขาว่า วันนี้ไป CICC พรุ่งนี้ถึง บันคีมูน แน่

(หมายเหตุ CICC = Coalition of the International Criminal Court )

แถลงการณ์ขององค์การเสรีไทยเพื่อสิทธิมนุษยชนและประชาธิปไตย

                              ทำไมการลงสัตยาบรรณจึงยังไม่สำเร็จ?

สุนัย จุลพงศธร

อดีตประธานกรรมาธิการการต่างประเทศ

สมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎร ประเทศไทย

ในช่วงระยะ 2 ปีเศษ ทำให้ข้าพเจ้าได้รู้ถึงอุปสรรคเชิงโครงสร้างที่สำคัญของระบอบการปกครองไทย ซึ่งทำให้เป็นการยากที่จะลงนามในสัตยาบัน ICC ทั้งนี้ อุปสรรคสำคัญดังกล่าวมีอยู่ 3 ประการ คือ

1. ในหลักการของ ICC ไม่มีข้อยกเว้นการดำเนินคดีแม้แต่กับประมุขของรัฐหากเกี่ยวข้องกับการกระทำผิดในข้อหาฆ่าประชาชนซึ่งเป็นเรื่องใหญ่ที่สุด แต่โดยกฎหมายแล้วนั้น การดำเนินคดีใดๆ กับประมุขของประเทศไทยไม่อาจจะกระทำได้ ดังนั้น การดำเนินการเพื่อเข้าสู่การลงสัตยาบันของไทยจึงไม่ได้รับความร่วมมือจากข้าราชการไทย ทำให้เรื่องICC ในไทยถูกทิ้งร้างมานานกว่า 10 ปี

2. การลงสัตยาบันผูกผันรัฐไทยนั้น จะต้องผ่านความเห็นชอบของรัฐสภาซึ่งมีสมาชิกจากการแต่งตั้งของกลุ่มสถาบันฯ และเผด็จการทหาร ร่วมกับสมาชิกสภาฝ่ายค้านที่ทำงานใกล้ชิดกับเผด็จการทหาร ซึ่งรวมแล้วมีมากกว่าครึ่งสภา

3. ในเชิงอำนาจแล้วนั้น สถาบันทหารไทยมีความสัมพันธ์อันแน่นแฟ้นกับสถาบันกษัตริย์ ไม่ว่าจะทั้งทางกฎหมายหรือทางวัฒนธรรม รวมถึงด้วยว่าตามข้อเท็จจริงนั้น เมื่อมีการยึดอำนาจดังเช่นปัจจุบัน การดำเนินการเพื่อพัฒนาประชาธิปไตยและสิทธิมนุษยชนก็จะถูกกีดกันอย่างชัดแจ้งจากสถาบันฯดังเช่นในขณะนี้

จึงนำเสนอเป็นข้อมูลประกอบการประชุมของ ICC ณ สำนักงานใหญ่องค์การสหประชาชาติ มหานครนิวยอร์ก ในเดือนธันวาคม ปี ค.ศ. 2014

Why Thailand must ratify the International Criminal Court? And why has it not done so?

By Sunai Chulpongsatorn

Former Chairman of Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representative of Thailand.

And Former Member of the House of Representative of Thailand.

One of the features political underdevelopment a country possesses a social structure that allows military dictatorship to flourish. This kind of structure hinders democratic progress in the country. Thailand is one of such countries. The case of Thailand may be even more difficult, as its political institutions are very complex, especially, the Monarch-Military relationship. This complex is manifested in the recent coup d'état. The involvement of these institutions is one of many reasons that hampers judicial and justice processes.

From 1973 to the present, more than half a century, I have witnessed the crime that the military have committed to the Thai people. Yet perpetrators and instigators are free with impunity. More than five massacres occurred; and countless intimidation against people went unnoticed. There are political groups that instigate many criminal activities aiming at obstructing democratic development. These groups and crimes are backed by dictatorial power.  One of the prime example is the seizure of the Bangkok International Airport in 2009. It has been five years since the seizure but the judicial process cannot even begin to bring justice despite abundant evidences.

As a politician, I, personally, do understand this structural problem. I believe there will be another bloodshed in the near future, in which it may even be more violent and intimidating than what happened in the past. That is because the current predicament involves a conflict within Thai political structure during this current volatile period.

As a matter of fact, when I was in my position, I believe it was my duty to help prevent any development that would threaten the livelihood of the people. And I strongly believe that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an important body that will be both a protection of human rights in Thailand and a hope for the lives of all Thais.

Therefore as the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representative of Thailand, I administered Thailand’s legislative process toward the ratification of the ICC commitment as the next step after Thailand became a signatory state to the Rome Statue since October 2000. Despite both legal and non-legal impediments in the process, I successfully did the following:

1.       I visited Honorary Sang-Hyun Song (then the Judge-President of the ICC) and Mr. Michel de Smedt (then the head investigation of the ICC) twice in The Hague, the Netherlands in 2011 and 2012. During both visits, however, I was publicly reprimanded and condemned by General Prayuth Chan-ocha (then Commander of the Army of Thailand) who is the current Coup leader and appointed Prime Minister of the Junta Government.

2.       During both visits, I followed up the case against Mr. Abhisit Vejchajiva, former Prime Minister of Thailand. Mr Abhisit was accused of committing crimes against Thai people over his order for a military crackdown on the pro-democracy protestors in May 2010, in which the case was filed by Mr. Robert Amsterdam. I also extended my invitation to the President of the ICC to Thailand. This meant to provide the information about the ICC for the public, especially for the Judge, the military and the police. This is to give the understanding about the ICC. As a matter of fact, the President accepted the invitation and the visit was scheduled in mid-2013. However, the visit was eventually cancelled for security reason when the anti-government demonstration started to expand to a full scale riot with a call for military intervention against the elected government

3.       Furthermore, I organized more than ten seminars within Thailand from 2012-2013 to disseminate the information about the ICC I also coordinated a meeting between the Thai Parliament and Ms Evelyn Balais-Serrano, Coordinator for the Coalition of the International Criminal Court – Asia Pacific (CICC Asia-Pacific). She also had an official meeting with Dr. Surapong Tovichakchaikul (then Foreign Minister of Thailand) to push and discuss about Thailand’s process of ratifying the ICC.

From my involvement in promoting the ICC in Thailand during those two years, I have come to understand clearly about structural impediments embedded in Thailand’s political structure. To simplify, there are three aspects that hinder the ICC ratification process as follows:

1.       The principle of ICC does not grant anyone immunity from prosecution for his/her crimes, even the head of state, if such crimes involve killing people. However, according to Thai laws, the head of the state cannot be prosecuted for any case whatsoever. Therefore, the ICC ratification process did not receive full cooperation from Thai bureaucracy and was intentionally delayed through red tape for more than 10 years.

2.       Ratification by Thailand as a state party will need an approval from the Parliament, which means it must be approved by both houses (the House of Representatives and the Senate). However, the majority of the Senate (both APPOINTED and elected) and the opposition, together constituted more than half of the members of Parliament, worked closely with the military to interrupt the process.

3.       In terms of political power, the relationship between the military institution and the monarchy is closely tied in both legal and traditional aspects. As a result, whenever there is a coup d’état the democratic process and human rights progress are openly stalled by these institutions. This is the situation Thailand is currently facingtoday.

I wish to present this information to the meeting of the International Criminal Court at the United Nations, New York City, December 2014.